

## Reading lists and bibliography

Bergamo–Pavia Master’s in Philosophical Knowledge: Foundations, Methods, Applications

180002-EN1 EPISTEMOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS-MOD1

*Lecture 1: Evidence and evidentialism*

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Lecture 2: Social epistemology

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